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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: LEGAL
EXPENSES OF CRIMINAL LITIGATION
AS ORDINARY AND NECESSARY
The note immediately following, dealing with the deductibility
for federal income tax purposes of legal expenses incurred by a
taxpayer in defending himself against criminal charges, went
to print before publication by the United States Supreme Court
of its decision in Commissioner v. Tellier, 34 U.S.L. WnnK 4297
(U.S. March 22 1966). Indeed, at the time the note was written
it was not anticipated that the Court would decide the Tellier
case during its October term. It may be conjectured that the
Court decided the case too promptly after argument because no
dissents were registered. Unanimous decisions by the Court in
federal income tax cases are infrequent.
The Court's holding is that legal expenses are deductible even
though incurred by a taxpayer in defending himself against
criminal charges, and even though his defense is unsuccessful.
The taxpayer, Tellier, had paid and deducted legal expenses of
2,924.20 dollars in defending against charges on which he was
convicted and sentenced to prison.
In his note, Mr. Evans has analyzed the traditional position
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue opposing deductions
for such expenses, the widely varying attitudes of the Tax Court
and the several circuit courts of appeal, and the views of com-
mentators on the subject. He concludes, on the basis of thorough
research and cogent reasoning, that such deductions should be
allowed. His conclusion, and the reasoning to that conclusion,
are vindicated fully by the Court's decision that these expenses
are deductible under Bection 162(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 as "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred . . . in carrying on any trade or business." *
Under section 162(a) deductions are permitted for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."' Questions
which arise concerning the phrase "ordinary and necessary" are
* William A. Clineburg, Assistant Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
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many and varied, but it is doubtful if any is as knotty as that
involving legal expenses incurred in criminal litigation.2
In all types of criminal litigation it is universally held that
a successful defense will render the legal expenses deductible.3
The questioned conduct, however, must be directly related to or
proximately result from the carrying on of any trade or busi-
ness.4 If the taxpayer is unsuccessful in his defense, the Com-
missioner has consistently disallowed any deduction for legal
expenses. This ruling has been sustained by the vast bulk of
judicial authority.5 The single exception had been in the area of
criminal antitrust litigation," but in 1962 the Internal Revenue
Service reversed itself,7 and deductions for legal expenses involv-
ing criminal antitrust litigation are now similarly disallowed.
In cases of civil liability arising from the conduct of the tax-
payer's business, deductions for legal expenses are allowed with-
out regard to the success or failure of the taxpayer's defense."
This is true even for legal expenses paid in connection with the
unsuccessful defense of a proceeding culminating in the imposi-
tion of a fraud penalty.9 Thus, if the litigation is civil, the legal
expenses incurred may be deducted, although the questioned
conduct may also subject the taxpayer to criminal prosecution ;1o
2. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3). "In the case of an individual, there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year . . . in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax." This is the first statutory recognition of legal
expenses as deductions. Quacre. Could a taxpayer who had been convicted of
criminal tax evasion deduct the expenses of the litigation under this provision?
3. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959); John
W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
4. Ibid.
5. See, e.g., Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Acker
v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958); Tracy v. United States, 151
Ct. Cl. 618, 284 F.2d 379 (1960) ; Port v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 334, 163
F. Supp. 645 (1958); Estate of Morris I. Ritholz, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 649
(1963); Alfred B. Cenedella, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 209 (1962); Sol
Schwaber, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 142 (1960) ; Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562
(1956); Simon Bloom, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 517 (1948); M. J. Donnelly, 7
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 839 (1948); Estate of John W. Thompson, 21 B.T.A. 568
(1930) ; cf. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
382 U.S. 808 (1965) ; Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956).
6. Rev. Rul. 11880, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 93.
7. Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 50.
8. See, e.g., Kottemann v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1936);
Robert S. Howard, 32 T.C. 1284 (1959); Harry Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946),
af!'d oft another issue, 167 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1948); Hal Price Headley, 37
B.T.A. 738 (1938); Citron-Byer Co., 21 B.T.A. 308 (1930).
9. Hopkins v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959).
10. John W. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
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as in John W. Clark1 where the taxpayer was allowed to deduct
attorney's fees in connection with a settlement of civil liability
for assault.12
A. Purpose, Intent, and Interpretation
The purpose of income tax legislation is to raise revenue. It is
not contrived as further punishment for those who violate crim-
inal statutes, which prescribe their own punishment whether it
be in the nature of a fine, imprisonment, or both. To use tax
legislation as a further punishment for criminal violators is to
abort the purpose for which it was intended. As Member Stern-
hagen of the Board of Tax Appeals so succintly stated in his
dissenting opinion in Burroughs Bldg. Material Co., "the
revenue act was not contrived as an arm of the law to enforce
State criminal statutes by augmenting the punishment which the
state inflicts."
In disallowing deductions for legal expenses incurred in the
unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution involving the tax-
payer's trade or business, the courts are applying section 162(a)
as though it were intended to encourage moral reform. This is
an erroneous application. Section 162(a) simply was not passed
for the purpose of reforming the morals of the business world.
Writers in the field have, for many years, attacked the courts'
application of the statute as a tool for moral reform.14 Randolph
Paul, commenting on this, said :1r
As exploration of relevant Congressional debates indicates,
Section 23(a) (1) (A) [now section 162(a)] is not an essay
in morality, designed to encourage virtue and discourage
11. Ibid.
12. Whether such expenses are, in fact, incurred because of conduct in which
the taxpayer has engaged while carrying on his business is another matter, and
is often the subject of controversy.
13. 18 B.T.A. 101, 105 (1929).
14. See, e.g., Arent, Inequities in Non-Deductibility of Fines, Penalties, De-
fense Expense, 87 J. ACCOUNTANCY 482 (1949) ; Brookes, Litigation Expenses
and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. REV. 241 (1957); Keesling, Illegal Trans-
actions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 26 (1958); Paul, The Use of
Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, U. So. CALUF.
1954 TAx IxsT. 715; Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of
Public Policy-a Critique, 17 FFD. B.J. 575 (1957); Stapleton, The Suprente
Court Redefines Public Policy, 30 TAxEs 641 (1952); Note, Deduction of
Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 852 (1941) ;
Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowances, and Public Policy, 72 YAIm L.J.
108 (1962).
15. Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing
Deductions, U. So. CALF. 1954 TAX IxsT. 715, 730-31.
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sin . . . . Nor was it contrived to implement the various
regulatory statutes which Congress has from time to time
enacted. The provision is more modestly concerned with
'commercial net income'--a businessman's net accretion in
wealth during the taxable year after due allowance for the
operating costs of the business .... There is no evidence
in the Section of an attempt to punish taxpayers . . . when
the Commissioner feels that a state or federal statute has
been flouted . . . When Congress has wished to deny tax
deductions as a means of reinforcing the sanctions of other
federal statutes, it has done so deliberately and explicitly.
In 1913 when what is now section 162(a) was being discussed
in committee there was some objection to its liberality. A pro-
posal was made to limit the deduction to "any legitimate trade
or business," but this proposal was rejected. 16 Senator Williams,
who was in charge of the income tax sections of the act, com-
mented on the proposal to limit the deduction to legitimate busi-
nesses and the purposes, generally, of Congress in passing in-
come tax legislation.1"
[T]o tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he has at
the end of the year after deducting from his receipts his
expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's moral char-
acters, that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not
levied for the purpose of restraining people from betting on
horse races or upon futures, but the tax is framed for the
purpose of making a man pay upon his net income, his
actual profit during the year. (Emphasis added.)
The fact remains that the phrase "any trade or business" has
remained unchanged. The phrase has never been limited or quali-
fied in any manner.
The word any standing alone is important, and more particu-
larly important when coupled with the stated intent of the stat-
ute as expressed by Senator Williams. The word does not qualify
the phrase "trade or business"; rather, the use of the word clearly
indicates that no qualification was intended. The phrase means
exactly what it says, namely, "any trade or business"; it doesn't
mean "only some" trades or businesses. If Congress had meant
something else, or had meant to limit the deduction, it could have
said, as suggested and i'ejected, "any legitimate trade or busi-
16. 50 CONG. REc. 3850 (1913).
17. 50 CONG. REQc 3849 (1913).
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ness." Or, as a further limitation Congress could have said, "any
trade or business with a legitimate purpose." Congress used
neither of these phrases, nor any other; Congress said "any trade
or business."
B. Grounds for Disallowance
Although Congress has placed no qualifying phrases or words
in section 162(a), the Commissioner, who has repeatedly been
sustained by the courts, has done what Congress refused to do.
Disallowance has been sustained on two grounds: (1) that the
legal expenses are not ordinary and necessary as it is neither ordi-
nary nor necessary to violate the law' s and (2) that to allow the
deduction would frustrate public policy. 19
The argument that the expense is not ordinary and necessary
has been afforded little sympathy by the Supreme Court. Of
legal expenses incurred by a taxpayer in his unsuccessful attempt
to resist the issuance of a fraud order the court said,20 "to say
that this course of conduct and the expense which it involved
were extraordinary or unnecessary would be to ignore the forms
of speech prevailing in the business world." The Court has also
declared that salary payments to employees engaged in running
the taxpayer's illegal gambling business may be deducted as
ordinary and necessary expenses. 21 The pronouncements by the
Supreme Court have, for all intents and purposes, laid to rest
the argument that legal expenses incurred in criminal litigation
involving the taxpayer's business are not ordinary and necessary.
The remaining ground for disallowance is public policy. This
argument is more forceful, but even it is subject to qualifications,
which the courts have apparently ignored when invoking this
doctrine.
In Commissioner v. Heininger22 the Supreme Court dealt at
length with the use of public policy as a ground for disallow-
ance, and in so doing laid down certain rules. The Court said
that expenses which are ordinary and necessary may nevertheless
be non-deductible if to allow the deduction would "frustrate
18. See, e.g., National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937).
19. See, e.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F2d 178
(2d Cir. 1931).
20. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 472 (1943).
21. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
22. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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sharply defined national or state policies."23 The Court did not
leave the determination of what constituted a frustration of
public policy to the whim of the Commissioner or the courts,
rather they said that "the policies frustrated must be national
or state policies evidenced by some declaration of them." 24 As
Randolph Paul pointed out, Congress has always been ex-
plicit when it intends income tax legislation to be used to supple-
ment sanctions imposed by other federal statutes. Section 162 (a)
contains no such declaration, rather it is broad and sweeping in
its terms--"any trade or business." The courts, nevertheless, in
the face of the requirement in Heininger of some declaration,
have repeatedly invoked the public policy argument in disallow-
ing the deduction.
Chief Judge Lumbard in his concurring opinion in Tellier v.
Commissioner25 argued that public policy now required that the
deduction be allowed. "In my opinion, there is no present basis
for the claim that such disallowance is consistent with public
policy; on the contrary, it seems clear to me that public policy
now requires us to allow the deduction." 26 This argument was
based on the recent recognition by the courts2' and Congress28
of the need for counsel by an indigent defendant. Chief Judge
Lumbard took note of the fact that the Criminal Justice Act,
29
passed by Congress in 1964, provides compensation for counsel
of an indigent defendant without regard to the outcome of the
trial. This he analogizes with deduction of legal fees by a de-
fendant who bears the cost of his defense.30
If the compensation of counsel under the Criminal Justice
Act does not depend on the success of the defense, it would
seem to follow that the allowance of the deduction should
not depend on the outcome in cases where the defendant is
able to and does assume the financial burden of defending
against criminal charges.
23. Id. at 473.
24. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
25. 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808 (1965).
26. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
382 U.S. 808 (1965).
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938).
28. Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
30. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
382 U.S. 808 (1965).
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The use of public-policy as a ground for disallowance has
lead to anomalous results. Fines imposed for violation of state
maximum weight laws by truckers-whether inadvertent"' or
not 3 --are not deductible as ordinary and necessary. Similarly
deductions for legal expenses incurred in defense of a criminal
prosecution are not deductible because, the courts have held, to
allow these deductions would frustrate public policy.33 On the
other hand rental payments made by a "bookmaking" establish-
ment and salaries paid to the employees of the gambling house
are deductible as ordinary and necessary.34 Also deductible are
gifts and entertainment provided by a corporation to public
officials, even though in contravention of state law.35 To allow
these deductions, according to the courts, would not frustrate
public policy.
In short, legal expenses are being equated with the payment
of fines and penalties, which seems totally illogical. Fines and
penalties are imposed because of some conviction for violation of
a penal law, whereas legal expenses are incurred to determine
if a violation has in fact occurred. Placing a stigma on the cost
of a bona fide defense, which is an integral part of our system
of justice, gives the act of hiring of counsel an undertone of
illegality. If the courts feel compelled to equate the cost of a
bona fide defense with illegal activity, surely legal expenses are
at least on a par with, and are as ordinary and necessary as
salary payments to employees engaged in carrying on an illegal
gambling business. Decision by analogy is unnecessary however,
if the courts simply apply the statute as it reads and was in-
tended to be read.
C. Criminal Conduct Not Involving Antitrust
The courts in holding legal expenses incurred in an unsuccess-
ful defense of a criminal prosecution involving the conduct of
the taxpayer's business non-deductible, often indicate that the
question had been well-settled from its inception.3 0 The Tax
Court in Thomas A. Joseph" emphasized the uniformity of the
31. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
32. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
33. Cases cited note 5 supra.
34. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
35. Dukehart-Hughes Tractor & Equip. Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 613
(Ct. Cl. 1965). See 17 S.C.L. Rav. 600 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956).
37. 26 T.C. 562 (1956).
1966] NoTms
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courts in sustaining the commissioner's disallowance, and in so
doing, the court cited several earlier decisions, including Sarah
Ba ker8s and Burroughs Bldg. Material Co.39 A review of these
early cases and one decided in the same year as Thomas A. Joseph
is illuminating.
In Sarah Backer the petitioners were the executors of the
estate of George Backer. Backer was called by an investigating
committee of the legislature of the State of New York in the
so-called "Lockwood Investigation." 40 Backer was asked if he
had ever made "pay-offs" to one Brindell, a labor union official,
and he answered that he had not. Later in his testimony Backer
admitted to making "pay-offs" to other unidentified union offi-
cials. Backer was indicted for perjury and subsequently tried.
The trial resulted in a deadlocked jury and the charges were
dismissed. The legal expenses incurred by Backer were deducted
as an ordinary and necessary expense of his construction business.
In sustaining the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction
the Board of Tax Appeals held that the expenses were not ordi-
nary and necessary, but rather were personal expenditures and
thus non-deductible. The court reasoned that the crime of perjury
was personal in nature and in no way could it have arisen from
carrying on a trade or business.
The decision is interesting due to the court's discussion of
public policy as a ground for disallowing deductions incurred
in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution involving
the business of a taxpayer. The court intimated that a distinction
may exist between a crime malum in se and one malum pro-
hibitum. "We must regard this as written into every statute,
especially as to such common crimes as are prohibited generally
throughout the land-those mala in se, which have immemorially
been regarded as contrary to public welfare."4 1 Inasmuch as the
case was decided on the ground that the expense was personal,
this discussion is mere obiter, but it betrayed the Board of Tax
Appeals' tacit recognition that the question was not open and
shut.
Some five years later Member Sternhagen, who had dissented
in Backer, again registered a strong dissent in Burroughs Bldg.
38. 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
39. 18 B.T.A. 101 (1929), afj'd, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
40. This committee investigated the practice of labor union officials of call-
ing strikes in the midst of large construction jobs and demanding a "pay-off"
before calling the strike off.
41. 1 B.T.A. 214, 216 (1924).
[Vol. 18
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MateriaZ Oo.,42 a portion of which has been cited above. Stern-
hagen's dissents coupled with the majority's intimation in Balcker
that the nature of the crime should be the determining factor
in disallowing deductions for legal fees in criminal litigation
clearly indicates that the early cases had not settled the contro-
versy as a matter of course.
As late as 1956 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Commissioner v. Sohwartz43 went out of its way to discuss the
deductibility of legal expenses incurred in defense of a criminal
1irosecution involving the conduct of the taxpayer's business-
a question not before the court-and refused to rule on it. After
commenting on several earlier cases disallowing the deduction,
the court remarked :4 "we do not pass upon the validity of the
premise thus accepted as it is not contraverted." If the question
had been as well settled as Thomas A. Joseph indicates the court
in Schwartz would have certainly approved the earlier cases.
The court, on the contrary, refused to grant approval to the
cases disallowing the deduction, making it clear that the problem
had not long since been put at rest.
Although the majority of courts have disallowed the deduction
there has remained an air of dissention over the validity of the
disallowance.
D. Antitrust
It is interesting to note that the deductions claimed for at-
torneys fees in the unsuccessful defense of criminal antitrust
violations have been handled differently from other criminal
violations by the Internal Revenue Service. It is for this reason
that criminal antitrust and the rules governing deductibility of
expenses in defense of this type prosecution requires special
attention.
The early cases (those prior to Commissioner v. Heininger)
had fairly well established that legal expenses incurred in an
unsuccessful defense of a criminal antitrust statutes brought by
either a state government or the federal government were non-
deductible.45 The same result followed where the suit was settled
42. 18 B.T.A. 101, 103 (1929).
43. 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956).
44. 232 F.2d 94, 99 n.9 (5th Cir. 1956).
45. Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934), (federal
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by the taxpayer and the government, 46 or where the taxpayer
pleaded nolo contendere.47 The only questionable area prior to
the Heininger case was where the suit was brought by private
individuals.
48
In Foss v. Commissioner40 the taxpayer was the principal
shareholder of the American Blower Company and similarly had
large holdings in a competing company. Minority stockholders
of the Blower Company brought a bill in equity charging the
taxpayer with violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and
sought to enjoin him from voting his stock. The District Court
granted both remedies to the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit vacated that portion of the order granting
the injunction. The taxpayer deducted the expenses he had
incurred in the suit, and the Board of Tax Appeals sustained
the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, reversing, allowed the taxpayer
to deduct the litigation expenses.
Some two years later the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Hel.
vering,50 although faced with a deduction involving government
and not private action, expressly rejected, by obiter dictum the
First Circuit's holding in the Foss case.
The focal point of any discussion concerning the deduction of
legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal anti-
trust prosecution is the decision of the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Heininger.51 Shortly after Heininger the Tax Court
decided Longhorn, Portland Cement Co.52 The Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue, following these two cases, issued G.M.C. 24377,53
which ruled that legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful
defense of criminal antitrust litigation were deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary expenses of doing business.
In Commissioner v. Heininger the taxpayer, a dentist, was
engaged in making and selling false teeth through the mail. The
46. Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934).
47. El Camino Refining Co., 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 669 (1942).
48. Compare National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937), with Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir.
1935).
49. 75 F.2d 326 (Ist Cir. 1935).
50. 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937).
51. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
52. 3 T.C. 310 (1944).
53. Rev. Rul. 11880, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 93.
[Vol. 18
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taxpayer sent circulars and advertisements through the mail
proclaiming the virtues of his product. The Postmaster General
determined that some of the language contained in the circulars
was misleading and some false. Based on this finding he issued
a fraud order prohibiting the Chicago Postmaster from paying
any money orders drawn to the taxpayer and directing him to
stamp all letters addressed to the taxpayer "fraudulent," and to
return the letters to the senders. The taxpayer, faced with the
destruction of his business, sought to enjoin the Postmaster Gen-
eral. The taxpayer succeeded in the District Court, but on appeal
the order of the District Court was overturned.54 The taxpayer
deducted the legal expenses he had incurred in his effort to
resist the fraud order.
The Commissioner, whose ruling was affirmed by the Board
of Tax Appeals, disallowed the deduction as not constituting
an ordinary and necessary expense of business.55 The court of
appeals reversed.56
In affirming57 it was necessary for the Supreme Court to
arrive at two determinations, (1) that the expense incurred was
ordinary and necessary and (2) that the deduction of the ex-
pense would not violate any sharply defined public policy.
In finding that the expense was ordinary and necessary the
Court said:
For respondent to employ a lawyer to defend his business
from threatened destruction was 'normal'; it was the re-
sponse ordinarily to be expected. . . .Since the record con-
tains no suggestion that the defense was in bad faith or that
the attorney's fees were unreasonable, the expenses incurred
can also be assumed appropriate and helpful, and therefore
'necessary'. . . . He was placed in a position in which not
only his selling method but also the continued existence of
his lawful business were threatened with complete destruc-
tion. So far as appears from the record respondent did not
believe, nor under our system of jurisprudence was he bound
to believe, that a fraud order destroying his business was
justified by the facts or the law. . . .To say that this
course of conduct and the expenses which it involved were
54. Farley v. Heininger, 70 App. D.C. 200 (1939), reVd, 105 F.2d 79 (D.C.
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 587 (1939).
55. S. B. Heininger, 47 B.T.A. 95 (1942).
56. Heinnger v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1943).
57. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
1966] NoT s
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extraordinary or unnecessary would be to ignore the forms
of speech prevailing in the business world.5
In determining that the deduction would not frustrate public
policy the Court said:
The single policy of these sections is to protect the public
from fraudulent practices committed through the use of the
mails. It is not their policy to impose personal punishment
on violators. .... Nor is it their policy to deter persons
accused of violating their terms from employing counsel to
assist in presenting a bona fide defense to a proposed fraud
order.5 1
The Court then went on to say that "to deny the deduction
would attach a serious punitive consequence to the Postmaster
General's finding which Congress has not expressly or impliedly
indicated should result from such a finding." 06
It is very interesting to note the Court's reading of the statute
regarding the lawful or unlawful character of the expense and
the position of the Internal Revenue Service as stated in its brief
in the Heininger case.
The language of section 23(a) [now section 162(a)] con-
tains no express reference to the lawful or unlawful charac-
ter of the business expenses which are declared to be deduct-
ible. And the brief of the government in the instant case
expressly disclaims any contention that the purpose of tax
laws is to penalize illegal business by taxing gross instead of
net income. (Emphasis added.) 61
The following year in Longhorn Portland Cement Co.6 2 the
Tax Court, following Commissioner v. Heininger, allowed the
taxpayer to deduct legal expenses it had incurred in arranging
a settlement with the state of Texas for alleged civil antitrust
violations.
It is to be noted that neither Heininger nor Longhorn involved
a taxpayer who had unsuccessfully defended a criminal prose-
cution. Both cases involved civil liability although the taxpayer
in Longhorn was faced with statutory penalties.
58. Id. at 471-72.
59. Id. at 474.
60. Id. at 474-75.
61. Id. at 474.
62. 3 T.C. 310 (1944).
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From 1944 through 1962 no cases arose in the criminal anti-
trust area due to the Commissioner's ruling in G.C.M. 24377,
cited above, ibut in 1962 the Internal Revenue Service reversed it-
self. 3 This was due to the antitrust suits which arose involving
the electrical equipment manufacturers and the subsequent con-
victions of the companies and their officers. In Revenue Ruling
62-175o4 the Service ruled that legal expenses paid or incurred
in unsuccessfully defending a prosecution for a criminal violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act are not deductible as an ordinary
and necessary expense of business. Two years later the Service
followed 62-175 with Revenue Ruling 64-224,5 in which it
declared that expenses incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a
criminal violation of antitrust statutes brought by governmental
authorities are not deductible, while expenses incurred in unsuc-
cessfully defending private actions are deductible.
E. Mandate For Change: Tellier v. Commissioner"6
The decision by the court of appeals for the second circuit
represents a marked departure from past authority. The court,
sitting en banc, unanimously ruled that legal expenses incurred
by a taxpayer in unsuccessfully defending himself against a
criminal prosecution are deductible as ordinary and necessary.
The decision is not final however, as certiorari has been granted.
The taxpayer was tried and convicted of violations of the
fraud sections of the Securities Act of 1933.67 In his unsuccessful
defense the taxpayer incurred legal expenses which he deducted.
The Tax Court, adhering to its earlier decisions, sustained the
Commissioner and disallowed the deduction.6" The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
The court based its decision on three grounds: (1) the purpose
of the Internal Revenue Code is taxation and not moral reform,0 9
(2) the expenses of the taxpayer were in fact ordinary and neces-
sary,70 and (3) to allow the deduction did not frustrate public
policy.
7 1
63. Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 50.
64. Ibid.
65. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 52.
66. 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808 (1965).
67. § 17, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
68. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062 (1963).
69. 342 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808 (1965).
70. Id. at 693.
71. Id. at 694.
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The court notes at the outset that there is nothing in the statute
which dictates or even suggests such a disallowance. In discussing
section 162(a) and its purpose, the court referred to the com-
mittee discussions relating to business losses, and in particular,
those made by Senator Williams, cited above, which make it clear
that the allowance of such deductions was not intended to be
prohibited.
The court then turned to the discussion of the meaning of the
phrase "ordinary and necessary." The court cited and discussed
Commissioner v. Heininger, noting that the Supreme Court had
never rendered a decision which lent any support to the proposi-
tion that legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a
criminal prosecution are not deductible, and saying "in fact the
Court has cast doubt on the rule by what it has said with respect
to the reasons ordinarily given to justify the existence of the
rule." The court concluded that the expense was "ordinary and
necessary,"72 and said:
[T]o the extent that the equation of illegality with extra-
ordinary and unnecessary is not question begging, it is ap-
plying special meaning to 'ordinary and necessary' which are
not applied in other connections. So long as the expense
arises out of the conduct of the business and is a required
outlay it ought to be considered ordinary and necessary.73
The court also dealt with the critical issue of public policy,
relying heavily on what the Supreme Court had said in Lilly v.
OommiSsioner7 4 in regard to public policy. The court in Tellier
noted that the Supreme Court had laid down the requirement
of governmental declaration of public policy which it stated
had never been done, and further stated that it doubts that such
a statement of public policy would be valid in the face of the
sixth amendments guaranty of the right to counsel.
7 5
The court concluded: "we hold that legal expenses are de-
ductible where they arise out of and are immediately or proxi-
mately connected with, and are required for, the conduct of a
trade or business." 70
The court's decision in Teller is the culmination of a long and
hard fought battle. After years of following what was in the
72. Id. at 693.
73. Id. at 694.
74. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
75. 342 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 808 (1965).
76. Id. at 695.
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first place a judge-made rule, one court has finally unequivocally
taken the position long advocated by Randolph Paul and
others.77 The Tellier decision points up the weakness and incon-
sistency which followed the rule disallowing the deduction.
F. Conousion
The state of the law today is virtually what it was prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v,. Heininger, with
the glaring exception of the Second Circuit's decision in Tellier.
In antitrust suits the Internal Revenue Service has come "full
circle," while in regard to other criminal violations, it has per-
sisted in maintaining that no deduction for legal expenses should
be allowed. The Supreme Court is now faced with the arduous
task of unravelling the web as woven by the courts and the
Service over the past forty years. At the very least the Court
can at last settle an area of the law which for too long has been
the subject of controversy and conjecture. At the very best, the
Court can apply the statute as it reads, and as it was intended
to be read, by affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Tellier v. Commissioner.
GEoPGE C. Evw s
77. See note 14 supra.
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